The Columbia Continuum

After giving it some thought, I’ve decided to put the Blakely Blog to bed for good. I feel that other blogs and similar resources on the internet are doing an excellent job of keeping up with all of news and developments in this area of law and my efforts are largely duplicative. Furthermore, my schedule (which includes assisting in a soon to commence criminal trial in the SDNY) has not permitted me to spend much time working on the blog since the Booker decision.

It’s been fun, though. When I started this little endeavor I never imagined that this blog would get the attention it received. I know that the Blakely Blog was a productive endeavor from the scores of emails I received from people whose friends and family members relied on this blog, as well as others, to help sort out a complicated issue that affected them very personally.

I’d like to thank all of the people that took the time to write to me and send me opinions and news from around the country. I’d also like to thank Laurie Cohen from the Wall Street Journal who interviewed me about the Blakely Blog this summer and even mentioned me by name in the Journal.

Although I won’t be blogging any longer, I plan on submitting at least one piece of writing on the Booker case sometime this year to a legal journal. You can keep an eye out for that in the near future.

Again, thanks for reading and I wish you all the best.

Sincerely,

Jason Hernandez
jph2026@columbia.edu

The second panel’s topic was: Considerations at Sentencing – What Factors are Relevant and Who Should Decide?

The moderator was Judge John Martin, Debevoise & Plimpton.

The panelists were:

Kyron Huigens, Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Kevin R. Reitz, Professor, University of Colorado School of Law
Paul H. Robinson, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School
Barbara Tombs, Executive Director, Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission

This is by no means a complete or official report on the symposium; the Columbia Law Review will have an official report soon. All errors are my own.

Paul Robinson

Prof. Robinson began his presentation by suggesting that the question posed to the panel is misleading because it makes the assumption that there is one decision maker. In fact, there are several and they make a number of decision on several topics, such as:

Policymaking – setting goals, purposes
Rule articulation – turning general policy into articulable rules
Fact finding
Judgment making – expressing normative judgments
Determining punishment amount
Determining punishment method

Prof. Robinson used a chart (which I will post here when I get my hand on it tomorrow) that illustrates the kinds of decisions made by different decision makers (legislatures, judges, sentencing commissions, parole boards, juries, etc.)

In his opinion, the SRA got it right, but the Commission got it wrong.

Kyron Huigens

Prof. Huigens began by professing a preference for discretionary sentencing. He spent a great deal of time exploring the tension between Williams v. NY and the Court’s most recent 6th Amendment jurisprudence. That tension – known as the Blakely paradox to some (or possibly just me) – is that a judges can do what Blakely proscribes only as long as the legislature has refrained from establishing a statutory structure to guide sentencing. It seems inconsistent that judicial fact-finding is acceptable in indeterminate systems where defendant’s have little to no recourse to appeal a sentence, but impermissible when the legislature creates guidelines. He promised to explore this topic in an article he is working on.


Kevin R. Reitz

Prof. Reitz said that the states that have done the best job are the ones that have put in presumptive guidelines. That list includes Minnesota, Washington, Oregon, Kansas, North Carolina and Ohio. (There may have been others that I missed.) The best ones, he said, remove the prison release discretion from parole boards.

The states that have indeterminate systems are driving the prison population explosion.

Prof. Reitz discussed some of the problems he has with Booker and Blakely. The effect of Booker when lined up in the context of other Supreme Court decisions that have created loopholes to the Sixth Amendment is what he called “Constitutional Swiss cheese.” And there may be more holes than cheese.

The holes are all of the exceptions to the Booker rule, which are:

Williams; Booker II
Harris; McMillan
Patterson

He summarized the lay of the land as follows. The following systems have no Blakley problems: voluntary guidelines, indeterminate sentencing, mandatory minimum guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes. The following systems have Blakely problems: presumptive guidelines, presumptive statutes, mandatory guidelines.

The jurisdictions with Blakely problems have two options – Blakelyization or avoidance (change the system entirely).


Barabara Tombs

Barabara Tombs began by explaining that Minnesota’s guidelines are driven by retribution as a penal philosophy. “That’s why we put people in prison.” (Or something close to that). She said that the Commission’s work is guided by their chosen penal philosophy. It helps the Commission to focus on what our guidelines can and cannot do.

She felt that Blakely and Booker will hurt the younger sentencing commissions more than the older ones.

She discussed some statistics from Minnesota which were of interest. In Minnesota they have a 2% upward departure rate for sex offenses and murder. There are a lot of downward departures in drug cases (60% in some cases). Curiously, Minnesota has mandatory minimum drug sentences but judges can depart downward from the mandatory minimum. (I’m not sure how that works).

Finally, she (sensibly, in my view) observed that Blakely was all about jury sentencing and after the first few pages of Booker, it seems to have disappeared. Where did it go?

Judge Martin

In wrapping up the panel, Judge Martin said that he was disturbed by how much deference is being paid to reducing sentencing disparities. He feels like we have elevated that goal to too high a position.

He said that he likes the new system over the old, because it leaves guidelines and appellate review. Hopefully Congress won’t jump in too quickly, he added.

The first panel addressed the topic of prosecutorial discretion and its changes. The moderator was CLS Professor Paul Shechtman.

The panelists were:

Martha Coakley, District Attorney, Middlesex County, MA
Michele Hirshman, First Deputy A.G., New York State
Nancy King, Professor, Vanderbilt University School of Law
Ronald F. Wright, Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law

What follows are some highlights from the panel discussion. This is by no means a complete or official report on the symposium; the Columbia Law Review will have an official report soon. All errors are my own.

This panel will explore whether prosecutorial discretion holds the keys to state sentencing, as many say does in the federal system.

Ron Wright

Prof. Wright began his comments by discussing the regulatory imbalance in sentencing. Analogizing the imbalance to other more traditional areas of regulation, he suggests that we can learn from the regulatory imbalances in sentencing.

On the topic of prosecutorial guidelines, Prof. Wright noted that some states like Kansas (and Minnesota) considered establishing prosecutorial guidelines, but in the end abandoned the effort. At least one state – Washington – has experimented with the idea of prosecutorial guidelines. These are internal guidelines, however.

Prof. Wright spent a fair amount of time talking about New Jersey, a state he described as not the hot bed of sentencing reform.

Nancy King

Whereas Prof. Wright’s focus was on macro-sentencing issues, Prof. King focused on the micro picture.

She noted that a great deal of the sentencing disparity debate has focused on racial disparities and disparity among sentencing judges. Missing from the analysis is a study of the mode of conviction. For example, sentences will vary depending on whether the defendant chose a bench trial instead of a jury trial, or went to trial at all. This is what some have called the guideline’s dirty little secret.

Prof. King is in the midst of studying data from 5 states (Pennsylvania, Maryland, Minnesota, Kansas and Washington) to study the disparities that arise based on different modes of conviction. This is a work in progress but she shared some of her preliminary results.

In Maryland and Pennsylvania she found that when the defendant chooses a jury trial, they are much more likely to be incarcerated.

(Except for cocaine offenses in Pennsylvania where bench trials are more likely to result in incarceration, but incarceration rates are lower in bench trials for simple possession).

In Washington, whether the defendant pled guilty, chose a bench trial or a jury trial, the rate of incarceration did not vary in a statistically significant manner.

In Minnesota she examined 3 offenses and found that in 5th degree drug cases, a bench trial meant the defendant was less likely to go to jail.

Prof. King also observed that in mandatory guideline states the bargain is over the charge, not the sentence, because there is no room to bargain about the sentence. Some have suggested that there needs to be a year between the top and bottom of the guideline for there to be meaningful sentence bargaining.

Michele Hirshman

Michele Hirshman has been working for the NY Attorney General’s office for the last 6 years. She immediately observed that it is important to get prosecutors to see themselves as seeking justice, not convictions.

In NY, the discretion of prosecutors is very limited. Grand jury proceeding place major restrictions on what a prosecutor can do, making it difficult to build a case. The prosecutor has to present a very big part of their case to the grand jury. Elaborate evidentiary rules that constrain how they can prove a case.

She discussed the significance of electing judges and prosecutors, arguing that this democratic check is the best way to constrain prosecutors.


Martha Coakley

Martha Coakley began her presentation by asking whether we were asking the right questions? First, we thought the problem was sentencing. We addressed that. Then we thought the problem was prosecutors. But what about the role of the defense counsel?

She suggested that better funding and treating defense work as a highly respected profession is an important way to check prosecutors.

She observed that in Massachusetts they have Rule 25(b)(2) which allows judges to reduce a charge if it’s unfair. Judges have more discretion than prosecutors. This is an important check on the prosecutor.

Finally, she argued that all crimes are not created equal. In child abuse cases the ability to intervene early is of utmost importance. Someone who abuses kids needs a different sentence and rehabilitative program than a bank robber.

We spend too much money on putting people in jail and focusing on sentencing guidelines.

This post is coming to you live from Columbia Law School’s state sentencing symposium. The symposium was kicked off with some opening remarks by Judge and CLS Professor Gerard Lynch. What follows are some highlights of his opening remarks.

Judge Lynch began his comments by noting the impeccable timing of the symposium. The timing, however, was fortuitous – the symposium was not planned as a response to Blakely or Booker. The original purpose of this symposium was to steer the sentencing conversation away from Congress and the Sentencing Commission, and towards the courts.

Sentencing is still a topic that is not given a lot of attention in criminal courses. Legal and academic writing tends to focus of Congress, although federal sentencing only composes 7% of the incarcerated public. This is especially significant given that the focus of federal law (white collar crime, immigration and drug crimes) is distinct from the traditional street crimes that most people are concerned about.

Although there is no clear pattern or trajectory in sentencing law, the states have been the true innovators in sentencing.

The symposium starts tomorrow at 1:30pm with Judge Lynch's opening remarks. The event is open to the public and free of charge.

For more details go here.

I'll be in attendance and blogging from the symposium.

Law.com has an interesting backstory to Justice Breyer's ethical quandary regarding the Booker case. Can one of the guidelines' architects decide their fate? Apparently, it not only matters what you ask, but who you ask. As you may recall, the bloggers spotted this issue well before the press. In this post from August, I discussed Justice Breyer's possible recusal, with a little help from the blogging community.

The Monitor has a good article discussing Booker's impact on different types of crimes. The article argues that Booker will affect white collar crime and drug crimes more than any other class of crimes, whereas more "serious" crimes will not be disturbed.

Tulsa World has an interesting article that is a few days old entitled, "Judge sticking with sentencing guidelines." Unfortunately, you have to be a subscriber to access the article. But, I did manage to find this little blurb:

U.S. Chief District Judge Sven Erik Holmes is a believer in guideline sentencing, and he intends to keep using the existing federal guidelines even though the U.S. Supreme Court said Wednesday that they are no longer mandatory.

Chief Judge Holmes issued a Blakely Blockbuster opinion in August in US v. O'Daniel. In that decision, he laid out a 4 point plan for bringing the guidelines into compliance with Blakely.

Interesting, It's-A-Small-World News: Alexandra Shapiro, the primary author of the New York Council of Defense Lawyers amicus brief, and a partner at Latham & Watkins NY, is co-teaching a Seminar in Federal Criminal Practice at Columbia Law School this semester. The course, which I am enrolled in, is also taught by Jonathan Bach, a partner at Kronish Lieb Weiner & Hellman LLP.

Sentencing is, of course, a big part of the seminar due to Blakely and Booker.

Findlaw.com columnist Mark Allenbaugh writes, "The Supreme Court's New Blockbuster U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Decision: A Clear Sixth Amendment Ruling, with an Invitation to Congress to Create a Better Remedy."

Salon.com cleverly pokes, "Supreme Court to Congress: Here's what you really meant." Salon asked the current chair of the American Bar Association's committee on sentencing, Jim Felman, a practicing defense attorney in Tampa, Fla., to shed some light on the surprising Supreme Court news.

The Washington Post editorializes, "The Court on Sentencing."

Oregonians will find the following article interesting, "A better way to set prison time - Hit to federal sentencing laws is a reminder to Oregon that the state also must update its court practices."

I have some coherent commentary planned for tomorrow. Until then, here are a few more news stories of note.

“Supreme Court generates more sentencing turmoil,” from The Columbian:

Stephen Kanter, a professor at Lewis & Clark's Northwestern School of Law, said many sentences may be reconfirmed, with judges saying they would have given the same sentence even if they hadn't been bound by guidelines.


“U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Made Advisory by Court,” from Bloomberg:

``It probably will create additional leverage for defense counsel in negotiating agreements,'' said B. Todd Jones, a former U.S. attorney in Minnesota. ``They know they have two bites at the apple now'' -- with prosecutors and judges.

Here is a collection of recent news stories on yesterday's opinions by the Court. Where relevant, I've excerpted interesting parts from the stories.

"High court loosens criminal sentencing guidelines," from the Seattle Times:

Gregory Poe, a Washington, D.C., attorney and former federal defender, said, "Congress is likely to make changes. And there is great concern that Congress may have an appetite to create a system applying strict penalties regardless of the merits in individual cases."

...

Frank Bowman, a professor at the Indiana University School of Law and a leading expert on the guidelines, said, "There is one thing that appears to be clear: The court has, by either judicial fiat or an act of statutory interpretation, created a system of advisory guidelines which, I think you can at least argue, give federal trial judges the greatest sentencing power they've ever had."

Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray said the Justice Department was "disappointed" that the court had made the guidelines advisory in nature, but emphasized that the opinion makes clear that trial judges still are required to consult the guidelines in making sentencing decisions.

"Area well poised in wake of Supreme Court sentencing decision," from the Waco Tribune:

Federal inmates at the McLennan County Detention Center in downtown Waco raised the roof for joy Wednesday morning after learning on television news that the U.S. Supreme Court had upended federal sentencing guidelines.

Most inmates there have yet to be sentenced and are waiting to go to court, said Thomas Medart, chief of security at the privately run facility.

"They're happy," he said. "It's postponed some of the sentencing that would have happened, but it's not creating any problems for us."

...

U.S. District Judge Walter S. Smith Jr., who presides over Waco's federal court and is chief judge for the Western District of Texas, said he wasn't surprised by the ruling. After all, Smith issued a ruling of his own in July saying the sentencing guidelines were not constitutional and violated defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

Smith said he was pleased with the decision because it will give federal judges more discretion in sentencing. He said

...

Whatever the fallout, Smith said he doesn't believe Wednesday's ruling will be the last word on the subject, an observation echoed on the Supreme Court. Congress will likely set higher mandatory minimums for many crimes, again taking away judges' discretion, he said.

Johnny Sutton, U.S. attorney for the Western District of Texas, said he needs more time to digest the high court's ruling. But it doesn't appear "the sky is falling," he said.

"Sentencing guidelines tossed out," from The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette:

Calling yesterday's decision a "mess," Ohio State University law professor Douglas Berman said: "This is going to be applied in diverse and dramatically different ways in the lower courts."

For students of the Supreme Court's internal politics, the split decision yesterday reflected the influence of Breyer, who worked on sentencing reform as the Senate Judiciary Committee's chief counsel in 1979 and 1980 and served on the Sentencing Commission from 1985 to 1989. "This is Breyer's revenge," said Berman. "He loves the world he created and wants to hold onto it any way he can."

...

Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa., who as the Judiciary Committee chairman would preside over any rewriting of sentencing law, reacted cautiously to yesterday's ruling. "I intend to thoroughly review the Supreme Court's decision and work to establish a sentencing method that will be appropriately tough on career criminals, fair and consistent with constitutional requirements," he said.

"Judges Freed From Sentencing Rules," from the LA Times:

By basically preserving the current system, the ruling is not likely to have a broad effect on criminals serving federal terms or those awaiting sentence. It is unclear what effect it will have on future sentencing.

"There are going to be a lot of disappointed criminals in federal prison today," said Kent Scheidegger of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, an organization in Sacramento that supports the rights of crime victims.


Some other stories include: "Sentencing ruling may aid Cianci's early release," from the Providence Journal; "Justices weaken sentencing rules," from the Philadelphia Inquirer;"Federal sentencing system to get overhaul," from the Knoxville News Sentinel.

I’ve put together some of my initial reactions to today’s decision in Booker and Fanfan. The decision is a whopping 124 pages and there’s a lot to discuss, of course. These are just preliminary thoughts that I hope to refine and pick-up in the next several months.

The first opinion, written by Stevens, addresses the first question: does Blakely apply to the guidelines? The answer is yes. Although there is plenty to talk about here, the real action is in the second opinion, authored by Breyer.

Two meta-observations. First, the tone of both opinions is rather matter-of-fact when compared to Blakely. Of course, Scalia is not exactly the kumbaya type, but I get the feeling that the bitter fight over the guidelines was waged in Blakely, not in Booker and Fanfan. Second, the Booker and Fanfan opinions don’t cite to academic commentary, whereas Blakely cited to academics on the issue of prosecutorial discretion and pleas. In the remedy opinion, the Court makes several assertions regarding alternative remedies that could have been more fully explored if they had cited to scholarly work.

Now, I’ll turn to a few topics that stuck out to me.

Elements, Statutory Construction and the 6th Amendment

The Court’s first citation is to In re Winship. To my surprise, the Court then discusses Jones at length. Jones was a statutory construction case where the Court was called upon to decide whether Congress intended to create 3 separate car jacking offenses, or whether the statute identified sentencing factors. Although Jones (and Castillo and Almendarez-Torres) are relevant, they do not pose 6th Amendment questions. These cases presume the answer to the question before the Court. We know that the government must prove all elements of an offense to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s unclear how this line of cases helps us understand how we should treat a leadership enhancement (which is not an element of any offense) in light of the 6th Amendment.

But here’s the tougher question: is drug quantity an element of the offense after Booker and Fanfan? The opinion suggests that they are not, but that they may have to be treated as elements. Judge Easterbrook’s dissent in Booker said that the majority’s conception of drug quantity under Blakely was nothing more than Apprendi. Ok. Where do we stand now?

(I recognize that my thoughts on this are inchoate, but it’s late and I’m still just thinking out loud.)

What’s good law now?

The majority opinion authored by Stevens was forced to confront the viability of several cases now that Blakely applies to the guidelines. Here’s a quick run-down of what the Court said: Dunnigan survives. Witte and Watts are inapposite because they did not present 6th Amendment questions. Edwards and Mistretta are not inconsistent with the Booker ruling.

I find it hard to believe that none of these cases were overruled, or at least recognized as being in tension with the ruling. One gets the feeling that Stevens is distinguishing these cases on very narrow grounds that may not survive closer scrutiny.

Retroactivity, Prior Convictions and Mandatory Minimums

Unfortunately, the Court didn’t say much (if anything) about retroactivity, prior convictions (Almendarez-Torres) or mandatory minimums, and fact finding that leads to the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences (Harris).
This isn’t surprising, I guess, given that the cases didn’t present any of these issues. My guess would be that the Court will now grant cert on a case to handle the retroactivity question, which is the most pressing of these three topics. The Court’s adherence and praise of the Apprendi/Ring line of cases suggests that Booker and Fanfan won’t be retroactive.

What Would Congress Do? (WWCD?)

Debates will surely rage over the majority’s take on what Congress would have preferred if faced with the limitations imposed by Booker and Fanfan.

I’ll just make a brief point here and return to the topic at a later date. The Court appears to interchangeably apply two standards here: what would Congress have intended and what will make the smallest fuss. The second standard appears to play a prominent role and I’m not convinced that that’s the right standard. I am also a bit skeptical of the Court’s zealous protection of judicial factfinding. Of course “court” meant “judge” in 1987. All we knew was judicial fact finding. I’m not convinced that this legislative preference should trump the newly invigorated 6th Amendment. Instead, we’ve been given a “soft” 6th Amendment jury trial right. This portion of the remedy opinion seems out of sync (“old school,” if you will) with the new, hip, “not your found fathers” 6th Amendment that Stevens “updates” for us.

Advisory Guidelines, Relevant Conduct and Uniformity

In the second opinion, the Court justifies its choice of advisory guidelines over a jury fact-finding regime, in part, on the need to ensure uniformity by adherence to the offender’s real conduct, as expressed by relevant conduct. The argument here is that if judges can’t take relevant conduct into consideration, there will be an unbearable sentencing disparity that the SRA was supposed to eradicate.

This argument, in my view, relies on some questionable assumptions about the ability of a jury fact-finding regime to properly “account” for relevant conduct. But even assuming that jury fact-finding could not account for relevant conduct, I’m not sure that the sentencing disparity that the majority is talking about here is the kind of disparity that gave birth to the guidelines. Base level offenses would remain unaffected by a jury fact finding system. The defendant would have to answer for any discoverable relevant conduct that makes it into the indictment. Just how much of a disparity are we facing here?

Not to mention that there are competing sentencing goals that are recognized by the SRA that would counsel against rigid adherence to a real offense system. The Court’s discussion of relevant conduct cast in light of uniformity concerns glosses over the fundamental incompatibility of Blakely and relevant conduct, in my view.

Here's some old news - the Supreme Court ruled today that Blakely applies to the guidelines. The remedy appears to be making the guidelines advisory, subject to appeal based on a "reasonableness" standard.

I just got my first look at the opinion(s), which you can access here. I reserve the right to correct my characterization if I made a mistake.

More to follow later tonight...

Well, in 5 hours I'll be on a plane to Ft. Lauderdale. The Supreme Court will announce any new decisions tomorrow at 10 am. So my prediction, based solely on my travel schedule, is that Booker and Fanfan will be decided tomorrow, as my plane takes off.

Details to follow, if I'm right, after I land in FLL.

Still no decision. The next possible day for a decision is tomorrow. That and you might even get that pony you wanted for your birthday.

I've just been made aware of some exciting additions to the upcoming Columbia Law Review symposium on state sentencing entitled, Sentencing: What's at Stake for the States?

The symposium will be held on the campus of Columbia Law School this January 21 and 22. And we might even have a Booker and Fanfan decision by then! Imagine that.

I've pasted the text of a recent press release announcing the event and some recent additions.


Judge William Pryor Headlines Symposium on State Sentencing Guidelines

Eleventh Circuit Judge William H. Pryor, Jr. Highlights List of Judges, Academics, and Practitioners Coming to New York to Debate the Merits of Various Sentencing Regimes

New York, NY --- The Columbia Law Review announced Thursday that it will be hosting a symposium entitled Sentencing: What's at Stake for the States? this January 21 and 22 on the campus of Columbia Law School in New York City. The symposium, centered primarily on state criminal sentencing regimes, will feature more than twenty of the most interesting and thoughtful voices in sentencing scholarship and practice.

The Supreme Court's decision last term in Blakely v. Washington will very likely lead a number of states to revise their sentencing guidelines, even if only to quell uncertainty as to the case's applicability. This symposium seeks to contribute to these endeavors by providing a forum for candid and lively discussions of the practical and theoretical implications of various sentencing systems and reforms. To that end, it will address a broad range of topics, including the institutional concerns inherent in guideline systems and the competing or complimentary policies underlying different sentencing frameworks.

The keynote address will be delivered by Judge William H. Pryor, Jr., of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Throughout his career, Judge Pryor has been an outspoken advocate of sentencing reform. As Attorney General of Alabama, he led the creation of that state's Sentencing Commission, which he saw as a means to achieve "truth in sentencing," eliminate unjust disparities, and relieve a serious prison overcrowding problem and budgetary crisis. He also has championed the use of alternatives to incarceration for first-time nonviolent offenders, such as work and restitution penalties, and counseling for drug offenders.

In addition to Judge Pryor, the symposium will feature professors Rachel Barkow (NYU), Frank Bowman (Indiana), Antony Duff (Stirling), Richard Frase (Minnesota), Kyron Huigens (Cardozo), Nancy King (Vanderbilt), James Liebman (Columbia), Marc Miller (Emory), Kevin Reitz(Colorado), Paul Robinson (Penn), Kate Stith (Yale), Paul Shechtman (Columbia), Michael Tonry(Cambridge), Ron Wright (Wake Forest), and Franklin Zimring (Boalt Hall); Middlesex County(MA) D.A. Martha Coakley; Michele Hirshman of the N.Y. Attorney General's Office; Roxanne Lieb of the Washington State Institute for Public Policy; Barbara Tombs of the MN Sentencing Guidelines Commission; and Judges Gerard Lynch and John Martin, Jr. (retired).

The symposium will begin midday Friday, January 21, highl